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Abstract

This thesis seeks to analyze the transformation of Russian active measures in targeted
national elections since the Soviet era. Through a historical analysis of research on active
measures and a contextual analysis of active measures campaigns themselves, this thesis finds
that Russian active measures techniques have not drastically changed since the Soviet era.
Instead, as a result of technology, Russian active measures have utilized platforms of social
media to become more targeted, continuous, and convert. Therefore, Russian active measures
campaigns have been better able to successfully target specific audiences, arguably making these
campaigns more effective.

5
Introduction

In 1983 an article was printed in an Indian newspaper claiming AIDS would pose a
grave danger to India after being created by the United States for a secret experiment. It listed
facts about the disease, publicly known U.S. biological warfare programs, and statistics in an
attempt to create some sense of truth. The information in this article spread to Africa and
eventually caused chaos and confusion when it was reported on U.S. national news. This false
narrative, or disinformation, came from the headquarters of the Soviet Union’s main intelligence
agency, the KGB. This method of instilling skepticism and fear in societies, developed and
polished in the Soviet Union, is being transformed during the Putin regime to become more
repetitive and targeted.1
According to Vasili Mitrokhin, a former Major in the KGB, active measures campaigns
were aimed at “exerting useful influence on aspects of the political life of a target country which
are of interest, its foreign policy, the solution of international problems, misleading the
adversary, undermining and weakening his positions, the disruption of his hostile plans, and the
achievement of other aims”.2 Active measures are a type of political warfare that include and are
not limited to disinformation campaigns, propaganda, blackmail, and political and economic
sabotage. Russia’s use of information warfare is an attempt to weaken the West by undermining
democratic processes. Active measures campaigns, originally used during the Soviet era, have
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transformed into sophisticated and seemingly unstoppable efforts to generate false narratives that
further Russia’s global and regional goals. On the surface, Russia’s goal in using information
warfare appears to be a means to create chaos and divisiveness within a region or country.
However, Russia seeks to use this chaos to fulfill its long-term strategic goals of gaining
superpower status, expanding its global influence, and fortifying Putin’s position of power.3
Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the United States Intelligence Community
Assessment stated that Moscow's provocations "demonstrated a significant escalation in
directness, level of activity, and scope of effort".4 I look at elections specifically because in
principle, elections sustain civil society and give people the freedom to choose their leaders.
Additionally, the domestic and foreign agendas of elected leaders can greatly impact the balance
of the international system and influence the democratic progress of their country. How have
Russian active measures in targeted national elections transformed since the Soviet Era? I
hypothesize that better access to technology has led to an increase in information consumption
allowing for Russian active measures to have a larger reach and potentially greater impact. As
technology has improved, Russian active measures campaigns have been better able to
successfully target specific audiences. The creation of social media has provided the world with
unprecedented access to information. Through my research, I find that Russian active measures
techniques have not drastically changed since the Soviet era. However, the platforms by which
Russian active measures are conducted have changed as a result of technology. I argue that social

3

Stricklin, Kasey. (2020). “Why Does Russia Use Disinformation?” Lawfare Blog. Accessed October 23, 2020.
http://www.lawfareblog.com/why-does-russia-use-disinformation.
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Elections.” 1-25, 7.
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media has greatly increased the world’s connectivity allowing for Russian active measures to be
more targeted, continuous, and covert.
After analyzing active measures campaigns from the Soviet and Putin era, I find that they
are not simply propaganda and disinformation, but instead, a part of Soviet and Russian foreign
policy that uses existing social and political issues to cause chaos and confusion in countries
around the world. I find that while Soviet and Russian active measures techniques and objectives
vary by case, the underlying goals remain the same. Russia does this through reflexive control in
which it compels adversaries to act in a way that is advantageous to the Russian agenda. Russian
actors do this by confusing and exhausting adversaries to control and create false narratives.5
Russia seeks to undermine civil society and western values while also maintaining influence in
regions where it has political interest.

Literature Review

Russian methods of political warfare in the Putin era have transformed to focus heavily
on driving wedges within societies by utilizing social and political pressure points. In Megan
Reiss’s article “Disinformation in the Reagan Years and Lessons for Today,” she compares
Soviet active measures campaigns to Russian active measures, specifically in the form of
disinformation, and suggests actions that can be taken to respond to Russian disinformation in

5
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the future. Reiss points out that a main difference between Soviet and current Russian active
measures are the vessels used to put out false narratives. Campaigns once conducted solely by
intelligence agencies are now being conducted by third parties, such as proxy sites and trolls,
making false narratives more difficult to trace.6
Active measures campaigns began in the 1920s focusing primarily on conspiracies, but
after World War II, transformed into professionalized efforts by the Kremlin to achieve foreign
policy objectives. Thomas Rid explains in his book Active Measures: the Secret History of
Disinformation and Political Warfare that all active measures campaigns have three
commonalities. First, they are not spontaneous lies by the government, but instead the meticulous
and thorough production of skewed and targeted information. Second, all active measures
campaigns have some form of disinformation embedded within them. Lastly, active measures
always have a goal--usually to weaken an institution that is deemed a threat by the Russian
government.7
Social media has become an extremely useful medium for Russian active measures.
Lieutenant Colonel Jarred Prier explains in his scholarly article “Social Media as Information
Warfare” that social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook utilize an algorithm which
analyzes words and phrases to form lists of topics based on popularity. This list not only allows
large audiences to view and contribute to discussion surrounding the most popular topics of the
time, but it also provides bots and trolls with the ability to create their own trends to disseminate

6
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their messages quicker. Prier explains that successful propaganda campaigns are not only
concerned with presenting one message, but instead they try to create “heuristics” which is “a
way the mind simplifies problem solving by relying on quickly accessible data.” People tend to
believe ideas they hear over and over again and social media contributes to the repetitiveness and
normalization of propaganda. Prier predicts that Russia will likely continue to be the front-runner
of active measures and that the unpreparedness of countries around the world to combat these
efforts will take a toll on the credibility and transparency of democratic institutions.8
In chapter six of the book The Russian Challenge called “Russia’s Toolkit” by Keir
Giles, he explains how social media contributes to the multiplier effect which greatly expands
the reach of Russian propaganda. Similar to Prier’s conjectures in his academic article, Giles
explains how Western media was unprepared for information warfare. Attempts by the media to
debunk disinformation has contributed to the Kremlin’s objective of creating alternative realities
through active measures campaigns. Additionally, the principles of freedom and transparency
emphasized in many Western societies unwittingly contributes to the amplification of Russian
narratives. Giles’s main fear is that Russian influence operations will trickle into the policy
making process, especially among Western powers, such as NATO, where cooperation and unity
is crucial. The main point of this chapter is to give caution to a potential “hybrid war” which
would utilize information warfare capabilities, military forces, and other government
mechanisms to influence policy and public perceptions around the world.9

8

Prier, Jarred. "Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare." Strategic Studies Quarterly 11, no.
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Methodology

The qualitative research design of this thesis focuses on two main types of sources. The
first source is mass media itself. Mass media in the form of television, radio, and social media
provides a platform where Russian intelligence officers and third-party actors can covertly
launch disinformation and propaganda campaigns. I analyze Russian and Ukrainian government
directives given to media outlets during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election and social
media content uploaded to Facebook and Instagram during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
My objective is to determine the importance of this content, why this content was released, and
determine the actors responsible for disseminating the disinformation or propaganda. I coded
pieces of disinformation and propaganda disseminated through mass media in order to determine
how the Kremlin utilizes social and political issues within a community. From the coding, I am
then able to contextualize how technology has shaped the tactics and objectives of Russian active
measures. The coding also allows me to systematically organize Russian disinformation in order
to determine the relevance of political and social themes regarding specific active measures
campaigns. Additionally, I am able to determine how the Kremlin is directly or indirectly linked
to each active measures campaign.
The second type of source is research and reports which seek to define and characterize
active measures, effectively compartmentalizing the chaos and confusion produced by active
measures campaigns. I perform a deep textual analysis of scholarly articles and reports on Soviet
and Russian active measures to provide insight into the transformation of active measures
through the summary and analysis of three Soviet case studies. This is important for a couple
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reasons. First, it allows the reader to understand the techniques, tactics, objectives, and long-term
goals of various Soviet active measures campaigns. Additionally, the case studies provide
important contributions in understanding the history and transformation of Soviet active
measures into the Putin era. This chapter provides a crucial contribution in setting up the final
two chapters which focus on the content of Russian active measures, specifically during foreign
presidential elections. It is important to note that the main primary sources for the first chapter
are interviews with KGB officers and U.S. intelligence documents from the Soviet era. It is
important to be aware that the perception of the Soviet Union from U.S. government agencies
during this time were often starkly anti-communist. As a result, these documents portray
democracy in a positive light, emphasizing the importance of economic freedom in sustaining
American prosperity and power. However, these documents are still important in understanding
not only how Soviet active measures have evolved, but also how public knowledge of active
measures has grown.

Structure of Thesis

My thesis is broken up into two main parts. First, I conduct a historical analysis of Soviet
active measures campaigns. I analyze active measures techniques used during three campaigns
conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s to determine how Soviet goals influenced the
methods and objectives of active measures. I find that while Soviet active measures techniques
and tactics varied by case, all three of these campaigns utilized existing fears and conspiracies to
undermine civil society. For my historical analysis, I use information released by former KGB
officers in the form of memoirs and interviews. This makes it possible to see if and/or how
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methods have evolved during the Putin era. Former U.S. intelligence documents provide insight
into techniques of active measures campaigns by the Soviet Union. However, it is important to
be aware of anti-communist sentiments evident in U.S. government documents that influence the
veracity of their claims.
The next section of my thesis is a contextual analysis of current active measures efforts in
elections. I look for what ideas are being promoted and how active measures are being
conducted. This points to an overarching question of why Russia chooses information warfare as
a primary method to obtain their goals. With the advancement of technology, Russia can
disseminate a large concentration of false narratives to a wide audience. Interviews with Russian
internet “trolls” give insight into the current active measures techniques. The information these
trolls give about the companies they worked for and their connection to Russia’s Internet
Research Agency (IRA), which is a well-known government disinformation agency, provides
valuable insight into the relationship between private enterprises and the Russian government.10
The last two chapters of my thesis will each focus on the elections taken place during the Putin
era where there is clear evidence of Russian propaganda. The first case study will be the 2004
Ukrainian presidential election. The second case study is the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The
reason for Russia’s involvement in these elections is to undermine civil society and the interests
of the West to even the global playing field for itself and its allies. However, a content analysis
of the narratives broadcasted during these elections will provide an understanding of how
disinformation has become more sophisticated in who and how it targets. The two elections I
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look at took place over a decade apart, and therefore, allow me to determine how Russian
interference methods have evolved in the twenty-first century and the role technology played in
these efforts.

14
Chapter 1: A Historical Analysis of Soviet “Active Measures” Campaigns

In 1979, Soviet agents conducted a disinformation campaign that blamed the United
States for the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by Islamic extremists. A couple years later
in 1981, the Soviet owned news agency TASS implied that the United States was behind the
plane crash that ultimately killed Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos.11 Propaganda and
disinformation are components of a well-established Soviet technique called aktivniyye
meropriyatiya or “active measures”. In this chapter I analyze the Soviet AIDS campaign, the
anti-TNF campaign, and active measures campaigns during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 to determine how the USSR conducted these operations, how these methods differed
depending on the USSR’s international and domestic goals, and who these campaigns targeted. I
argue that while Soviet active measures are tailored to each campaign, the underlying
characteristics and overall goals remain the same. These active measures campaigns exacerbated
existing distrust toward public institutions and utilized political and cultural environments to
target specific audiences in order to support Soviet agendas in specific regions around the world.

The History and Transformation of Soviet “Active Measures”

KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov stated in an interview in 1984 that the goal of
disinformation in the United States is “to change the perception of reality of every American, to
such an extent that, despite the abundance of information, no one can come to sensible
conclusions in the interest of defending themselves, their families, their communities, and their

11
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country”.12 The Soviets used the term “active measures” to describe a type of political warfare
that included and was not limited to disinformation campaigns, black mail, efforts to control
foreign media, forgeries, front organizations, and propaganda.13 Soviet active measures were
strategies of manipulation that sought to create an environment that favored Moscow’s agenda in
particular countries or regions of the world.14 The overall goals of active measures have
remained the same over the past century: to weaken other countries politically and socially to
make Russia appear stronger and/or to maintain influence in regions where Russia has policy
interests. However, the means and objectives of specific active measures campaigns have varied
greatly. Russian active measures campaigns have sought to achieve their goals by attempting to
weaken relationships between allied nations, undermine specific groups’ trust in their nation’s
institutions, and create divisions among societies based on ideology, ethnicity, and race.15
Disinformation as a modern tool of political warfare began in the 1920s, but it was not until after
World War II did it become more tactical, professional, and well-funded. In the 1920s and
1930s, disinformation primarily focused on conspiracies and was not very organized. In the
1970s, active measures campaigns began to share more characteristics with the Russian influence
operations conducted during the Putin era---it became organized chaos.16
Active measures were primarily produced and implemented by the Soviet security agency
known as the KGB, specifically KGB’s Service A unit. Service A conducted active measures and
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assigned officers abroad to assist in the process.17 Former KGB officer who now goes by the
name “Larry Martin” stated in an interview that KGB officers were expected to come up with
ideas for disinformation campaigns and were evaluated based on the quality and quantity of their
proposals.18 Each officer of the KGB Service A unit was tasked with spending at least 25 percent
of his time creating and conducting disinformation campaign ideas.19
Many Western powers viewed active measures as mere falsehoods that the Soviets used
to weaken their adversaries. However, many Soviets involved in producing disinformation
believed that it exposed the evils of capitalism and emphasized various social issues in the
West.20 The process of creating, analyzing, and implementing Soviet active measures was
lengthy and required a great deal of conceptualization. The first part of the active measures
process was receiving orders from the KGB headquarters to begin the campaign. After the goahead, KGB officers did extensive research on the target, reading local news, books, and other
sources that would be useful in developing ideas for active measures. Next, the headquarters
would review the ideas for the disinformation campaign. The approval process would begin, and
translators would become involved in the campaign. Then, the headquarters would release the
story in foreign media, usually through newspapers and media in developing countries.
Sometimes, Soviet media would pick up the story and further circulate it pointing to the nonSoviet original version as a way to deny any involvement.21

17
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Soviet Active Measures and the AIDS Epidemic

The Kremlin realized that the key to a successful disinformation campaign was to
emphasize specific themes over a long period of time. For example, in the 1980s, the Soviets
launched an active measures campaign that implicated the United States in creating the AIDS
virus. Similar to other KGB active measures operations which utilized media outlets in
developing countries, the Soviets released an article in the Indian newspaper The Patriot in
1983.22
Many times, it is hard to measure the success of active measures campaigns. However, in
the case of the AIDS campaign, it is clear that it was successful, and its long-term effects may
still be evident. There are a couple of characteristics that make this active measures campaign
effective. First, the campaign used underlying public weariness toward governmental
institutions. The American public in the 1970s was already weary of the government after it
recently learned about U.S biological warfare research that occurred early in the Cold War.
Therefore, the idea that the fairly unresearched AIDS virus could be a biological weapon was not
too far out. Second, the campaign aligns with an already existing political and cultural
environment. In the United States, racial tensions were at a high and rumors of AIDS being a
biological weapon targeting people of African descent were widespread. The AIDS virus was
sweeping through Africa which added to the credibility of this conspiracy. The virus also had a
severe effect on the gay community, as it disproportionately affects gay men. The Reagan
administration's unhurried response to the virus also prompted the gay community and its

22
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supporters to be skeptical of the U.S. government.23 Eventually, the active measures campaign
was debunked with the help of the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) which was
created in 1981 to openly discuss and combat Soviet active measures campaigns. Despite an
effort to combat disinformation, the seeds of doubt planted by Soviet active measures have had
possible long-term implications. In 1997, 29 percent of Africans Americans believed that the
statement “AIDS was deliberately created in a lab to infect black people” was true or possibly
true.24 It is impossible to measure the true effectiveness of active measures, but that is what adds
to its credibility. Although the AIDS campaign was debunked, seeds of doubt were sown in the
American public concerning the trustworthiness of the U.S. government. Soviet active measures
were meticulous campaigns that required a great deal of manpower. During the Soviet era, the
KGB honed-in on developing active measures tactics and this did not go unnoticed by the
USSR's adversaries. In a 1981 report, the United States Department of State wrote a special
report that warned of possible advancements of active measures in the imminent future that
would be more sophisticated and difficult to discern.25

Soviet Active Measures Against NATO

In 1979, NATO decided to modernize its TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) in response to
Soviet military build-up during the Cold War. NATO’s TNF modernization campaign included
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the deployment of over 400 ground-launch cruise missiles and over 100 Pershing IIs in various
European countries.26 The Soviets saw this as not only a security threat to the USSR, but also as
a prolongment of the American military commitment in Europe.27 Soviet active measures against
NATO’s TNF modernization campaign were conducted using different political and economic
influence operations to dissuade European countries from supporting NATO’s TNF
modernization campaign. Soviet ambassadors, stationed in various NATO member countries,
attempted to coerce officials to express opposition against the TNF campaign by offering to
manipulate Soviet oil and gas prices for their respective country. The Soviets used two main
tactics in an attempt to prevent TNF modernization: a “campaign from above” and a “campaign
from below”. The goal of the Soviet anti-TNF campaign was to utilize existing public fears
surrounding nuclear weapons, create confusion among policymakers, and preserve Soviet
nuclear posture.28 The “campaign from above” was an attempt by the Soviets to weaken the
relationship between the United States and its European counterparts. The Kremlin did this by
attempting to convince the European public that the Reagan administration’s reckless and
confrontational behavior was endangering European lives. The Soviet Union proposed new
initiatives that aimed to convince the public that the Soviets wanted peace while the United
States wanted to expand its power and influence in Europe.29
The Soviet “campaign from below” consisted of the utilization of existing public fear and
speculation surrounding the NATO decision. Soviet active measures against NATO also
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included the creation of front organizations, most which were founded by local communist
parties among NATO member countries. All of these front organizations were managed by the
International Department of the CPSU Central committee which worked in conjunction with the
Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB.30 The Soviet Union attempted to use these
organizations to broaden the scope of their campaign by gathering public support against
NATO’s TNF campaign. The Soviets used front organizations to involve other groups such as
pacifists, anti-nuclear activists, and environmentalists in order to prevent the anti-TNF campaign
from appearing to simply be a Warsaw Pact campaign against NATO. The role of these religious
organizations and other groups helped the campaign reach audiences that held various political
and social views. While the independent peace groups varied on political stances, they provided
a united front regarding disarmament. For example, Great Britain’s Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament worked with the group called the Association of Democratic Women in Denmark,
which was the Danish branch of a larger communist front organization. Together these two
organizations voiced objection to U.S President Ronald Reagan’s “zero option” which stated the
United States would not deploy more missiles in Europe as long as the Soviets disarmed theirs in
Eastern Europe.31 Additionally, at the international level, the World Peace Council located in
Helsinki, the Christian Peace Conference in Prague, and the World Federation of Scientific
Workers were all Soviet front organizations. At the national level, the German Communist Party
(DKP), for example, was connected with many communist and noncommunist affiliates ready
and willing to be involved in anti-TNF campaign efforts.32

30

Alexiev, Alexander R. (1985). “The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means.” RAND
Corporation, 1–60, vi.
31
G., Jeffrey. (1982). “Moscow and the Peace, Offensive.” The Heritage Foundation. Accessed on March 18, 2021.
https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/moscow-and-the-peace-offensive.
32
Alexiev, Alexander R. (1985). “The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means.” RAND
Corporation, 1–60, vii.

21
In the 1970s there was growing dissent amongst the public concerning the use and
deployment of nuclear weapons. Most Soviet resources during this active measures campaign
were allocated toward NATO countries that were most likely to vote against TNF modernization.
This is not surprising since the Soviets preferred to use existing social and political schisms
during active measures campaigns. During this specific campaign, the Soviets were very active
in the Netherlands where many people were hesitant to support nuclear armament in Europe. The
Communist Party of the Netherlands used a front organization to sponsor an international forum
that was instrumental in convincing the Dutch parliament to vote against the NATO TNF
modernization.33 This Soviet active measures campaign began before NATO announced its
decision to modernize its TNF. The campaign was extremely targeted and played an important,
yet discreet role in fostering public dissent towards NATO. Despite NATO ultimately moving
forward with the TNF campaign, several European countries experienced public unrest and
weariness among government officials before the final vote. Brussels, for example, experienced
anti-nuclear protests and intense parliamentary debates leading up to its final vote on the TNF
modernization campaign. Additionally, Norway sought to reevaluate the final TNF decision after
two years.34 The Kremlin’s use of exacerbating existing anti-American and anti-nuclear
sentiments among the public is a prime example of a long-standing Soviet active measures tactic
of undermining civil society in an attempt to produce an outcome desirable for the Soviet Union.
Unlike the AIDS campaign where the Kremlin used conspiracies and blatant lies to convince
people that the virus was created in an American lab, during the anti-TNF modernization
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campaign, Soviet intelligence officers used the legitimate concerns of nuclear armament held by
the public. In this case, the Kremlin manipulated factors in order to amplify public discord in an
attempt to polarize communities within NATO member countries.

Soviet Active Measures in South Asia

Despite dissent from most of the international community, Soviet forces entered
Afghanistan in December 1979 in an attempt to unite factions within the Afghan Communist
Party. However, as an anti-communist insurgency mobilized, the Soviets found themselves in the
middle of armed combat. The USSR used active measures techniques, mostly in the form of
disinformation, to direct attention away from the USSR’s presence in Afghanistan. In 1980, the
KGB began political warfare operations in South Asia. The Soviet Union sought to secure its
interests in Afghanistan by attempting to prevent outside powers from interfering in its efforts to
support communism. KGB assets warned the Pakistani Embassy in Moscow that if Pakistani
leader Zia-ul Haq gave into requests from the United States and China to allocate territory for a
base for the Afghanistan armed struggle, then the USSR would exploit human rights movements
within Pakistan as well as utilize existing public opposition toward the country’s regime.35 The
Soviets created and disseminated hundreds of leaflets (which stated they were produced by a
group of Pakistani military officers) criticizing Pakistani foreign and domestic policy.
Additionally, the Soviets used disinformation in an attempt to arbitrarily link the United States to
the possible development of Pakistan’s own atomic weapons.
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Simultaneously, Soviet disinformation in India and Iran attempted to prove to the
governments that Pakistan was preparing to use its military against both countries.36 The USSR
also attempted to weaken India relations with the West through disinformation that sought to
convince India that NATO and the United States had plans to establish an “anti-Indian” alliance
in which Pakistan played a major role.37
Similar to Soviet active measures during the anti-TNF modernization campaign, Soviet
active measures in South Asia utilized existing concerns held by the public. Soviet active
measures in this campaign primarily focused on exacerbating the tensions between Pakistan and
India while more broadly attempting to weaken the region’s relationship with the West. The
Soviets' use of disinformation was an attempt to create unrest within Pakistan and in South Asia.
The goal was to distract other influential powers from infringing on the Kremlin’s larger goal of
securing Afghanistan as a communist proxy.

Discussion

The effectiveness of Soviet active measures lies in the public’s inability to discern the
truth and the primary source relaying this false information. The Soviet active measures
campaigns discussed in this chapter take place in different regions, utilize different techniques
and tactics, and have varying agendas. However, the major Soviet goals and objectives remained
the same. In all three case studies, Soviet active measures attempted to exacerbate existing intragovernmental or internal tensions to achieve different Soviet agendas. The AIDS campaign
sought to weaken the United States by sowing seeds of doubt amongst the American public. The
36
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campaign sought to divide the American public by exacerbating existing social tension while
simultaneously pitting the public against the U.S. government. The anti- TNF campaign was an
attempt to emphasize public dissent toward the modernization of nuclear forces amongst NATO
member countries and create confusion among European policymakers. The campaign in South
Asia was an attempt to promote and secure communism abroad while also attempting to weaken
U.S. alliances abroad. However, in all three cases, the overall goal was the same: to weaken the
West and civil society and/or maintain influence in regions where it has political or economic
interests. Soviet active measures used methods of propaganda, disinformation, forgery, and
blackmail in an attempt to ensure Soviet foreign policy goals. While these methods are still used
during the Putin era, the growth of technology and access to media has greatly expanded
Russia’s reach and, subsequently, the effectiveness of active measures. Russia has been aware
for decades that nations are stronger united, and by discrediting civil society, the Kremlin is
rendering democracy ineffective.
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Chapter 2: A Contextual Analysis of Russian “Active Measures” Campaign Efforts in the
2004 Ukrainian Presidential Election

Russian political technologist Gleb Pavlovsky said, “we live in a mythological era. We
have gone back to the Ancient World where the distinction between myth and reality didn’t
exist”.38 In the early 2000s, technology assisted in the spread of mass information making it
more difficult to discern truth from fiction. The 2004 Ukrainian presidential election marked the
end of President Leonid Kuchma’s two-term presidency which was tainted in political scandal
and corruption.39 Putin and his allies saw the election as a way to maintain diminishing influence
among former Soviet Republics and prevent the rapid expansion of EU influence in Eastern
Europe. It was no secret that Putin supported Viktor Yanukovych, whose platform emphasized
cooperation with Russia. Putin not only publicly backed Yanukovych during the election, but
also congratulated him on winning the election before votes were even counted.40 Russian
disinformation efforts in Ukraine focused on utilizing public and private Ukrainian and Russian
media outlets to exacerbate ethnic conflict by often weakening the credibility and reputation of
opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, and sometimes promoting the “status-quo” candidate,
Viktor Yanukovych. These methods were not unlike the “active measures” techniques used by
the Soviet Union which often sought to undermine or discredit Soviet opponents and political
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figures who did not align with Soviet agenda or ideology. Additionally, Soviet active measures
campaigns preferred to use non-Soviet media outlets to broadcast falsehoods and this method has
been and currently is part of Russia’s disinformation efforts abroad.41
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the goals of Russia during this election align with
those mentioned in Chapter 1: to undermine civil society, discredit democracy, and weaken the
relationship between the public and government institutions by sowing seeds of doubt. I argue
that Russia’s active measures efforts were extremely similar to those conducted during the Soviet
era. Similar to Soviet active measures methods, Russia used foreign media to support the
presidential candidate that aligned with its interests by censoring free speech through the use of
weekly government directives known as “temnyky”, which can be translated to “little themes”. It
is likely that these directives were called “temnyky,” a diminutive of the word “tema” (theme), to
make the media feel less threatened by their true nature. During the 2004 Ukrainian presidential
election, temnyky circulated from Ukrainian and Russian government actors to agents of the
media. Temnyky were weekly directives given to media outlets that gave clear orders on what to
broadcast, what not to broadcast, and how to broadcast a specific event or topic.42 In this process,
there were important intermediaries, Russian political technologists, who wrote and facilitated
the distribution of temnyky between the state and media. In 2003, there were 791 television and
radio stations registered in Ukraine in addition to 3,925 newspaper outlets.43 If news sources
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wanted to stay on the “right” side of politics (i.e. support Kuchma and Yanukovych) and
maintain political access, then they would have to obey the directives.
Russia used a well-established Soviet technique of exacerbating existing cultural
differences to achieve its goal, which in this case was to gain support for Yanukovych. Russia
utilized cultural differences, primarily concentrating on the Ukrainians differing visions for the
country’s past and future, to further divide the public.44 The main difference between traditional
Soviet active measures techniques and the techniques seen during this election was the reach of
television media outlets. Traditional Soviet active measures relied heavily on print media to
conduct campaigns, but the rise of privately-owned media and the growth of web-based media in
the early 2000s in Ukraine made news more accessible on a variety of platforms.45
When Vladimir Putin became President of the Russian Federation in 2000, he had the
skills and knowledge to expand Russia’s disinformation campaigns. Not only was Putin former
head of the intelligence agency, the FSB, but he was also involved in foreign intelligence during
the late 1970s conducting active measures campaigns against West Germany during the Cold
War.46 Disinformation during the Cold War and in the early 2000s was done overtly. While there
was an effort to conceal these disinformation campaigns, the role of Moscow could be made
fairly clear. Russia’s favorability for one candidate over the other in the 2004 Ukrainian
presidential election was obvious to much of the public who was aware of the active measures
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campaign by the Russian and Ukrainian governments which consisted of voter fraud, poisonings,
and weekly directives given to media outlets.

Background

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has sought hegemony over Eastern
European countries, specifically Ukraine. Ukraine’s geopolitical location makes it a crucial state
to both Russia and the West. When Leonid Kuchma was elected president in 1994, Ukraine saw
a tightening of media freedom and the growing power of oligarchs in politics.47 The
“Kuchmagate scandal” in which President Kuchma was linked to the disappearance and murder
of prominent Ukrainian journalist Georgy Gongadze in 2000 weakened Ukraine’s relations with
the West. Subsequently, Kuchma turned to improve relations with Russia.48 In the 2004
Ukrainian presidential election, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, who both served as
Kuchma’s Prime Minister during his presidency, ran for president to determine whether Ukraine
would favor closer ties with Russia or make strides to form better relations with the West, which
would severely hurt Russia’s influence in the region.49
The main perpetrators of disinformation during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election
are known as political technologists. The definition of political technologist in Russia depends on
a person’s political beliefs. To some, Russian political technologists are master manipulators
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who were created during the 1990s to create a façade of democracy and distract the public from
the lack of energy wealth in the country.50 To others, political technologists are simply
consultants, political analysts, or policy experts. However, one thing is certain: political
technologists are connected to the Kremlin either directly or indirectly. Their position is
officially unassociated with the Russian government allowing Putin to deny Russian involvement
when necessary. Interestingly, some of the most well-known political technologists were
perceived to be Russian liberals in the 1990s. Gleb Pavlovsky was a dissident during the Soviet
era, Marat Gelman was a gallery and art-collector, and Sergei Markov was a fellow for the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Each of these political technologists seems to have
varying interests but what unites them all is their position against mainstream politics of the
Russian intelligentsia. They believe the only true liberal institution in Russia is the Kremlin.51
In this election, Russia very overtly supported candidate Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych for the presidency and this is extremely evident in Russian disinformation which
was presented primarily in the form of temnyky. Russian political technologists Gleb Pavolvsky,
Marat Gelman, and Igor Shuvalov were the main authors of this form of disinformation and
worked closely with the Ukrainian oligarchic Social Democratic Party (SDPUo) and the Kuchma
administration to censor media outlets. While neither major presidential candidate was a member
of the SDPUo, the SDPUo fully backed Kuchma in 1999 after barely receiving four percent of
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votes in the 1998 parliamentary elections.52 After this, it switched its ideology to support
increased Russian cooperation and expressed anti-western sentiments hoping to gain more public
support. Temnyky grew from close ties between Gleb Pavlovsky’s Foundation for Effective
Politics, which serves as a political advisory unit for presidential campaigns and elections more
generally, and the SDPUo.53 These political technologists were sent to Ukraine on orders of the
Kremlin and overseen by former president Dmitrii Medvedev.54 Russia’s primary strategy in this
election was one of “directed chaos”. A Russian political technologist defined this as,
“Apocalyptic scenarios for the possible future must not be presented as utopian but become a
reality. Our task is to destabilize the situation in the regions, involving political games, but not
the everyday economy, and drag Yushchenko into this game”.55

Research Methodology

The contextual analysis portion of my research focuses primarily on disinformation in the
form of temnyky which were released by the Social Democrats, members of the Ukrainian
presidential administration, and Russian political technologists. The temnyky I looked at were
compiled with the assistance of the Ukrainian newspaper, Ukrayinska Pravda, which was
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founded in 2000 by Georgiy Gongadze in an attempt to expand free speech in Ukraine, and
archived by Kharkiv Human Rights Group.56 These pieces of temnyky were given to Ukrainian
media outlets between 1999 and October 31, 2004, which marked the first round of voting for the
Ukrainian presidential election where both Yushchenko and Yanukovych failed to receive 51
percent of the votes. To fill the information gap between the first rounding of voting on October
31t and the last round on December 26, I use newspaper articles from Russian, Ukrainian, and
American news sites to analyze whether Russian government rhetoric corresponds with the
temnyky themes released before voting began.
The temnyky I analyzed were released between 2002 and 2004. I focused briefly on
pieces of temnyky released during Kuchma’s presidency in 2002 and 2003 because it helps
understand the rhetoric of the Ukrainian government leading up to the election and it gives
insight into the extent to which Russian technologists and Ukrainian officials had control over
mass media. Additionally, Russian political technologists played a part in authoring
disinformation pieces during the 2002 Campaign for the Verkhovna Rada, so we can
acknowledge that the temnyky released during this time were a part of Russian disinformation
efforts. Russian political technologists Gleb Pavlovsky, Marat Gelman, and Igor Shuvalov
authored many of the temnyky and therefore, the majority of the directives are in Russian.57 This
adds to the plausibility that the temnyky written and produced during this election is a form of
Russian disinformation. I chose to analyze temnyky that most clearly demonstrate the motives of
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the Ukrainian and Russian government. By this, I mean that the directives given to Ukrainian
media align with Russian interests. They express a preference for Yanukovych over the
opposition leader, Yushchenko, show Kuchma in a positive light, and ignore or condemn free
speech and press, especially journalism ethics.
After analyzing each piece of temnyky individually, I created categories and
subcategories based on themes apparent among the directives. The themes were divided into six
main categories: Journalists/Media, Presidential Candidates, Elections, the Ukrainian
Government, and the Ukrainian Public. After I determined the themes, I created more specific
subcategories that demonstrate Russian and Ukrainian preference toward Kuchma, Yanukovych,
and the military and an aversion toward Yushchenko, public demonstrations, and journalists and
the media more generally.
The code numbers help determine not only what themes the Ukrainian and Russian
government emphasized through weekly directives, but why and how? The majority of temnyky
focused on the presidential candidates, primarily attempting to portray Yushchenko as an unfit
leader with poor health and bad morals. This is not surprising as a common strategy of Russian
active measures is to tear down one candidate in an attempt to discourage voting from the
candidate's respective party. Additionally, the coding showed that the Ukrainian public was
rarely mentioned, despite being the primary audience of temnyky. The Ukrainian government
focused on indoctrinating citizens with propaganda about the two main candidates, not expecting
a reaction to the extent of the Orange Revolution. Therefore, talk of demonstrations was easily
squashed by the media and not a main priority of temnyky. Additionally, talk of elections and
polls in Ukraine was very rarely mentioned, likely in an attempt to prevent the public from
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questioning if the results were fair or not. However, when temnyky mentioned the media
discussing polls results and the “dynamics'' of each candidate, we can assume that the poll results
and conversations about each candidate were skewed in favor of Yanukovych.

Findings

The main trend among Russian active measures efforts during elections is utilizing
“chernyi piar” or “negative campaigning”. This means attempting to destroy a person or group’s
reputation and credibility. “Chernyi piar” seeks to disseminate information that may or may not
be true about a person in order to destroy his or her public image. This “negative campaigning”
was a main tactic of Russian active measures during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Instead of attempting to win the election for Yanukovych, the temnyky sought to portray
Yushchenko as a weak, unhealthy, and unfit leader. In the weeks leading up to the first round of
voting, the temnyky focused heavily on the poor health of Yushchenko. Directives released
during the week of October 3, 2004 emphasized Yuschenko’s eating and drink habits,
mentioning specific meals he ate and alleged alcohol preferences. These directives stated that
Yushchenko’s poor health “is confirmed by the information of his medical cards, which
documentarily refute Yuschenko’s claims that he does not have chronic diseases.”58 Not only are
these directives aimed at damaging Yushchenko’s character, but they also seek to sow seeds of
doubt and ultimately distrust in the public towards Yushchenko. Another directive a week later
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continued the discussion of Yushcenko’s health stating that he was an alcoholic and that for nine
months during 2002 he went to the hospital over 60 times.59 The emphasis on Yushchenko’s
health is important because in December 2004 he was diagnosed with dioxin exposure. It is
believed that he was poisoned in early September by allies of Yanukovych, but the severe side
effects of dioxin took weeks to develop. These temnyky constantly seek to convince the public
Yushchenko is not fit to be a leader. It would appear that the goal of this was to sow seeds of
doubt over a long period of time, so that when something did happen to Yushchenko that would
affect his health, the public would be further convinced of their suspicions initially planted by the
temnyky years earlier. The gradual effects that dioxin had on Yushchenko started with a
headache and abdominal pain and became more visible in December when his skin developed
lumps and turned a shade of dark grey. It was not a coincidence that the temnyky during the
months of September and October corresponded with Yuschenko’s declining health. The
orchestrators of the directives likely played a role in poisoning Yushchenko. When Yushchenko
was asked in a BBC interview if he believed Putin was behind the poisoning, he stated “I have an
answer, but I cannot voice it.”60 The poisoning of Yushchenko demonstrated that temnyky
usually did not stand alone. Ukrainian and Russian officials often distorted reality to compliment
their weekly directives. In this case, the poisoning of Yushchenko solidified the temnyky that
consistently portrayed him as a weak and unhealthy leader. Not only do these directives seek to
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discredit Yushchenko, but they also provide important insight into the relationship between the
media and the government.
Temnyky almost always directed media outlets to ignore or omit topics of journalism and
ethics from their broadcasting, especially concerning well-known Ukrainian journalist Georgiy
Gongadze. Gongadze was a critic of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and frequently wrote
about the corruption within the Ukrainian government. In 2000, he was abducted, beheaded, and
his body was found in a forest near Kyiv. Soon after, tape recordings were released implicating
Kuchma in orchestrating Gongadze’s murder.61 Temnyky released in 2002 near the anniversary
of Gongadze’s death directed the media to “disregard” the announcement that information was
received concerning the whereabouts of Gongadze’s head.62 In 2004, the directives shifted to be
more specific, ordering the media to ignore any talk surrounding the Kuchma tape scandal and to
refrain from broadcasting comments from the opposition concerning Gongadze’s death.
Temnyky released near the anniversary of Gongadze’s death stated that “analysts believe that if
[Gongadze’s death] is covered by the media, it will depoliticize this topic, exclude comments
from opposition representatives, refuse to mention the ‘cassette scandal’, and refrain from
showing massive opposition rallies timed for this day.”63 It is interesting that this commentary
specifically begins by using the phrase “analyst believe” then follows with presumptions
concerning how the media “will” relay this information. It appears that the government was
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attempting to provide some sense of objectivity and give a choice to the media despite there
being an obvious and correct way to proceed with this information. It is not a surprise that talk
surrounding Gongadze’s death was reignited during the 2004 presidential election. In 2000, a
decapitated corpse was found in the woods, but Ukrainian government authorities did not
confirm it was Gongadze’s body until March 2003. This revelation revived the international
attention present when Gongadze first went missing. As a result, temnyky became more focused
on silencing the anniversary of Gongadze’s death near the election as Kuchma did not want more
scandals or talk of corruption which might jeopardize public support for Yanukovych.
Additionally, during Yushchenko’s campaign, he pledged to launch an investigation into the
murder of Gongadze which reignited support for independent journalists and anti-corruption
efforts. 64
Almost all conversation surrounding free speech and journalism, especially discussion of
independent journalists, was shut down by temnyky directives. In April 2004, the Union of
Journalistic Solidarity organized a dedication to the memory of Ukrainian journalists Alexander
Krivenko and Taras Protsyuk. Identical to the temnyky disseminated about Gongadze, the
directives told the media to “disregard” this memorial service.65 The Ukrainian and Russian
government already felt threatened by the influence of independent journalists, and this
heightened around the election. The two governments were worried that journalists, especially
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those outspoken and critical of the government, would cause the public to question the fairness
and transparency of the election.
Temnyky played an important role as the main vessel for the dispersion of
disinformation. However, Russian and Ukrainian political technologists utilized other methods as
well. Political technologists used unfamiliar candidates’ broadcasting time as a way to propagate
anti-Yushchenko sentiments. Russian political technologists also paid extreme nationalists to say
they supported Yushchenko and went as far as hiring the same group of people to commit acts of
terror that were then blamed on Yushchenko.66 Temnyky after the terrorist attacks around the
Troyeshchyna market in Kyiv gave orders to media outlets to broadcast that Yushchenko
supported and defended the terrorists who committed the act. These directives also explicitly laid
out how the media should portray the events of this attack compelling them to “provide
emotional statements from the sellers at the market about how they felt during the explosion.”67
The government likely hoped that these accusations about Yushschenko’s defense of the terrorist
in conjunction with the emotional accounts by people in the marketplace would further discredit
Yushchenko’s character and dissuade the public from supporting him. Russia’s investment in the
election became more evident between the first round of voting on October 31 and the runoff on
November 21 which declared Yanukovych the winner. In early December, Putin dismissed the
opposition’s request for a repeat of the runoff and he condemned European attempts to mediate
in the election.68 During this time, Kremlin-backed political technologists, in conjunction with
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Yanukovych and his allies, used temnyky as a political and social tool in an effort to sow seeds
of doubt among the Ukrainian population toward Yushchenko.
The basic strategy in the disinformation efforts during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential
election was to create an ethnic split amongst the Ukrainian population by portraying
Yushchenko as a nationalist, fascist, and Russophobe. Yanukovych was already a popular figure
among most of the eastern and southern Ukrainian population due to his promise to maintain
close relations with Russia and make Russian an official language in Ukraine. Yushchenko,
however, was seen as a nationalist who planned to close down Russian speaking schools and
force the Ukrainian language on the Russian-speaking populations.69 In this election, Russia’s
main goal was to keep Ukraine reliant on Russia. This was done by weakening Ukraine
politically and socially.
One way this was executed was by sowing seeds of doubt in Yushchenko supporters.
From Russia’s perspective, the issue of gaining votes was not the main issue. The election was
rigged from the beginning. Yanukovych was already the favored candidate in eastern and
southern Ukraine, so gaining votes in these regions was not a priority. Russia and the Kuchma
administration expected Yanukovych to win from the beginning so while securing votes was
important, it was not the main goal. The strategy was to convince the Ukrainian population that
Yanukovych was the sure winner in the election, so Yushchenko supporters would not bother
going to the polls. Additionally, the goal was to manage possible uproar; so, when Yanukovych
was announced as the new president, the public would not be surprised.
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Another way Russia attempted to weaken Ukraine politically and socially was to
maintain the notion that Ukraine was ‘a younger brother’ and that it needed the assistance of
Russia to handle its foreign and domestic affairs. Russia’s policy toward Ukraine has been based
on three main themes. First, Russia seeks to preserve its linguistic and cultural bond between the
two countries. Second, Russia actively attempts to maintain Ukraine’s inefficient economic
model that relies heavily on the importation of energy consumption—which primarily comes
from Russia. Third, Russia seeks to build and maintain the idea that southeastern Ukraine is a
source of conflict among various Ukrainian regions.70
The temnyky I analyzed led up to the first round of voting on October 31, but Russia’s
interference in the election did not end there. The Orange Revolution which began on November
22 after the runoff election a day prior was a direct result of obvious voter fraud and election
falsifications.71 Hundreds of thousands of Yushchenko supporters gathered in Kyiv’s
independence square to protest the results of the runoff which declared Yanukovych the winner.
Russia saw the Orange Revolution as a threat to its sphere of influence in Ukraine and also saw
the possible ramifications of the revolution as a direct threat to Russia’s political system and the
system of other former Soviet countries. Russian mass media attempted to portray the revolution
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as an “anti-government revolt” or “ultra-nationalist coup” with underlying anti-Russian
sentiments.72
The use of Ukrainian and Russian media outlets as primary vessels for disinformation
during the 2004 election was flawed but also effective in some ways. It was effective in the sense
that it furthered ethnic division within Ukraine by solidifying many Russian speaking
Ukrainians’ positive sentiments toward Russia. However, the overtness of the disinformation
attempts created distrust among most Ukrainian citizens toward their government and Russia.

Discussion

Russia’s disinformation campaign efforts in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election
were overt and obvious to many people around the world. It is not a coincidence that Russia’s
intervention in Ukraine and other countries increased when Putin rose to power.73 His primary
goal of restoring Russia’s ‘superpower’ status meant gaining influence and securing Russia’s
interests domestically and internationally. In the case of Ukraine, Putin and the Russian elite felt
that Russia was losing influence in former Soviet republics. Therefore, Ukraine became a foreign
policy priority for Russia to maintain linguistic, economic, and military ties.74 Russian active
measures during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election relied on many Soviet techniques, such
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as disinformation and blatant propaganda through the use of foreign and domestic media sources.
The primary perpetrators were well-trained political technologists who planned this targeted
campaign for years. The process relied on access to a multitude of media outlets around Ukraine,
which was achieved through Soviet active measures techniques such as political and economic
blackmail and bribery. Ten years after the election, however, when Ukraine underwent another
revolution and was in conflict with Russia in the Donbas region, Russian active measures looked
much different. Russian cyber hacks installed viruses onto Ukrainian servers, deleted important
files, and remotely changed votes.75
Russian disinformation efforts in foreign countries have been around since the Soviet era,
but the growth of technology in the early 2000s and exponential use of social media greatly
expanded Russia’s reach. Social media has provided Russia with a large platform and wide
audience. Allegations of Russian involvement in the 2020 U.S. presidential election and recent
cyberattacks on private tech companies and the U.S. government coincide with Russia’s long
history of disinformation efforts, especially in elections.
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Chapter 3: A Contextual Analysis of Russian “Active Measures” Campaign Efforts in the
2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Former Foreign Intelligence Service officer Sergei Tretyakov discussed how Russian
intelligence officers would often go to libraries, where it was cheaper and easier to access
computers, in New York in the 1990s. They used the public servers to receive orders and also
disseminate disinformation to various websites and news outlets. He said the goal “was to cause
dissension and unrest inside the United States and anti-American feelings abroad”.76 With the
creation of Facebook in 2004 and Twitter in 2005, social media began to take off. Research once
done by sending intelligence officers to the target country to study the political and social
environment could now be done remotely. This has allowed for active measures campaigns to be
covert, targeted, and extremely dangerous.
In this chapter, I argue that Russian disinformation during the 2016 U.S. presidential
election used similar methods to that of the 2004 Ukraine presidential election and that of Soviet
times. Not unlike the Russian active measures techniques during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential
election, Russia’s active measures during the 2016 U.S. presidential election supported one
candidate over the other, exacerbated ethnic and racial tension, and sought to undermine
democracy by amplifying public distrust in government institutions. I argue that the biggest
change to Russian active measures techniques over the past couple decades has been a result of
technology. The role of the internet played an important part in conducting active measures
campaigns during the 2016 election allowing for cheaper, fast, and more repetitive content which
was able to reach larger audiences. Social media platforms have allowed Russia to expand its
76

Rid, Thomas. (2021). ACTIVE MEASURES: the Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. S.l.:
PICADOR, 332-333.

43
reach and employ various actors, such as trolls, to participate in these active measures
campaigns. The years of 2015 and 2016 were marked with intense and emotional conversation
surrounding social issues such as racial discrimination, criminal justice, gun control,
immigration, and abortion. Social media became a spotlight for presidential candidates to express
their platforms to a wide audience. Bots and Russian trolls reinforced the polarization that was
already occurring in the United States.77
In 2020, the European Commission announced that Russian disinformation campaigns
are the European Union’s largest threat. Russian disinformation campaigns date back to the
Soviet era and have transformed over the last century to be extremely targeted and sophisticated.
It is not a coincidence that Russian disinformation efforts are more prevalent during elections.
Since Vladimir Putin rose to power in the early 2000s, he has centralized power by increasing his
role as president and almost eliminating the role of oligarchs in politics entirely. Following the
beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, Putin saw social media as something that could threaten
Russia’s political stability, especially with the Russian presidential election approaching in 2012,
and therefore, began to monitor and have greater control over popular social media platforms
such as VKontakte and Telegram.78 Whereas the Russian government uses media outlets to
maintain stability in Russia, it uses social media and other platforms to destabilize and create
chaos in countries abroad. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the primary social media
platforms used by Russian trolls were Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
For the data analysis, I primarily focus on Facebook and Instagram posts released by the
Kremlin-back Internet Research Agency (IRA) to determine the role of technology has
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contributed to the evolution of active measures campaigns. The IRA was also active on Twitter
during the election, but the House Intelligence Committee has only released names of Twitter
accounts, not specific content. Additionally, I use interviews with and about Russian “trolls”,
who played a large role perpetrating active measures campaign efforts in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. In this chapter I argue that technology has greatly expanded the reach of
Russian active measures, allowing for more actors to carry out information operation efforts
while simultaneously influencing a wider range of audiences.

Background

Many aspects of Russian disinformation have not differed greatly from the Soviet era,
however, the anonymity of the internet has provided Russian active measures campaigns with
unprecedented covertness and directness. Russian disinformation tends to focus on political and
social topics that are considered polarizing to the groups of people within a population. The
social issues that it focuses on do not have a clear agenda or ideological focus, but instead, seek
to target a wide range of audiences to undermine the public’s trust in its institutions and each
other. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian trolls and intelligence agents used
Facebook and Twitter to push out content that aligned with specific groups’ beliefs. This method
of disinformation is not only effective but also cheap. During this specific disinformation
campaign effort, Russian accounts reached over 150 million users at a price of only $100,000.79
In order to understand the social and political environment surrounding the 2016 U.S.
presidential election, it is important to understand sentiments toward Democratic candidate,
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Hillary Clinton, and Republican candidate, Donald Trump. Russian trolls used their reputations
to further divide the American public’s views on the candidates and the election more generally.
The American public’s satisfaction with two presidential nominees was at its lowest in over 20
years.80 Trump’s brash rhetoric and use of social media and years of conspiracy theories
surrounding the Clinton family created a distrust of both candidates by the American public and
the media. In 1986, Trump met with a Soviet ambassador to discuss building a hotel in Moscow,
and the next year he visited Russia. After he returned to New York, he began pursuing more
political ambitions. While it is hard to say definitively whether or not Trump’s trip to Russia
influenced his ambitions, we cannot deny that Trump’s connection to the Kremlin made him an
easy pawn for Russian active measures campaigns during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.81

Russian “Trolls”

Russian disinformation is chaotic, yet consistent. It often appears unorganized, yet it is
effective. Russian disinformation campaigns are executed by many different actors, including
intelligence officers, trolls, bots, proxies, and supporting actors, such as WikiLeaks.82 In the first
chapter, the main perpetrators of active measures campaigns were KGB officers. Following the
fall of the Soviet Union, we see in the second chapter that the main actors involved in active
measures are Russian political technologists. The line connecting perpetrators of active measures

80

Smith, S. (2015, August 28). “24% of Americans now view both GOP and Democratic PARTY
UNFAVORABLY.” Pew Research Center. Accessed March 13, 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/08/21/24-of-americans-now-view-both-gop-and-democratic-party-unfavorably/.
81
Chait, Jonathan. (2021). “An Ex-KGB Agent Says Trump Was a Russian Asset Since 1987. Does It Matter?”
Intelligencer. Accessed March 5, 2021. https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/ex-kgb-agent-trump-russian-assetmueller-putin-kompromat-unger-book.html.
82
Polyakova, Alina, and Spencer P Boyer. (2018). “The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, and the
Coming Age of Global Digital Competition .” Foreign Policy at Brookings, 1–24, 10.

46
directly to the Kremlin has become more blurred. The Kremlin’s use of third-party actors has
allowed it to deny any involvement in disinformation and has provided it with a multitude of
vessels in which to conduct active measures campaigns. The main perpetrators of active
measures campaigns during the 2016 U.S. presidential election were Kremlin-backed internet
commentators, more commonly known as “Russian trolls”.
In the last ten years, Russian trolls have utilized divisive political and social issues in
disinformation campaigns. Of course, there are lone Russian trolls who are politically motivated
to spread disinformation, however, the majority of trolls are employed by farms that pay a nice
salary in exchange for writing targeted posts on social media platforms. Many of the actors
involved in these campaigns are not aware of the true extent that their jobs play in undermining
state sovereignty or they may choose to simply deny it. Alleged Russian troll, Sergey Polozov,
who works as an IT manager at the Internet Research Agency (IRA), was accused of renting
servers to cover up the IRA’s disinformation efforts in the United States. The Internet Research
Agency is a major Russian-government linked troll farm founded by Russian oligarch and close
Putin ally, Yevgeny Prigozhin. In an interview with BBC, Polozov claims he created websites
and that none of his work was in English. Despite these claims, he admits that he would be proud
to have assisted his country in interfering in the U.S presidential election if he thought that
indeed happened.83 This is interesting because while monetary motivation seems to be the initial
driving factor behind the work of trolls, the work they do is political in nature and may play a
role in fostering patriotic sentiments.
In 2013, a couple of Russian men infiltrated a troll farm by interviewing for a job that
consisted of writing on multiple internet platforms including social sites and blogs. According to
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a troll the men talked to, the goal was to increase site traffic through specific posts. The troll
explains that artificial bots can be helpful in some instances, but technology has become more
sophisticated and sometimes servers will block bots if they are recognized. Therefore, manpower
is key to a successful campaign with each troll required to write and upload around 100 posts per
day. The troll farm emphasizes that the job is flexible, with individuals creating their own
schedule and also receiving weekly payments and free meals.84 The majority of trolls that work
in troll farms are monetarily motivated. In another instance where a man infiltrates a troll farm,
he explains that the job description lacks a great deal of information about job specifics but
instead hopes that the high salary will entice people willing to do any work for money. He soon
discovers that most of the men who work at the troll farm came after long and unsuccessful job
searches. The trolls are given simple instructions about what their posts should and should not
include.85
The role of Russian trolls was highlighted by the media and intelligence agencies as the
major force undermining the integrity of the 2016 presidential election. However, Russia’s
disinformation ecosystem is much more complicated than one entity running the show. Instead,
multiple communication centers play a role in creating, validating, and reinforcing
disinformation making it much more dangerous than it was during the Soviet era. Russian
disinformation comes from many different sources, making it more difficult to trace.
Additionally, the information being released by these various players is often contradictory.
Russia does not have to harmonize disinformation because then it makes the truth harder to
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define.86 In the case of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Kremlin-backed IRA used social
media platforms to further indoctrinate the right, while attempting to splinter the left by
undermining progressive accomplishments and holding the left accountable for racial injustices.
This way, democrats would be discouraged to vote, and conservatives would be more motivated
to vote in the election.

Research Methodology

In January 2017, the U.S. Intelligence Community released its yearly Intelligence
Community Assessment (ICA) where it laid out Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. Following the release of the ICA, the House Intelligence Committee
Minority released the names of Twitter accounts and Facebook and Instagram posts linked to the
Russian troll farm, the Internet Research Agency (IRA). The Committee has over 80,000 pieces
of Facebook content produced by the IRA but has only released a representative sample. They
plan to make all posts by the IRA public in the future.87 It is important to note that while there
are individual trolls who are individually motivated to participate in disinformation campaigns,
the IRA is the largest troll farm whose motives can be monetarily and politically linked to the
Kremlin.
The content I analyzed was released between 2015 and the election in November 2016. I
created two excel sheets where I tracked the username associated with each post, the text of the

86

United States Department of State. (2020). GEC Special Report: Pillars of Russia's Disinformation and
Propaganda Ecosystem, 6.
87
“Exposing Russia's Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements.” U.S.
House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2018. Accessed January 29,
2021https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/.

49
post, the landing page, target group, number of impressions and clicks the post acquired, the date
the content was created, and the language of the post. After, I created a code index to track
themes displayed in the content and the repetitiveness of each theme. This was helpful in
determining how widespread political and social issues corresponded with different points in
time between 2015 and 2016.
Russian trolls in 2015 and 2016 focused primarily on content targeting members and/or
supporters of Blacks Lives Matter, the LGBTQ community, and right-wing groups. In 2015, the
content focused heavily on the LGBTQ community, highlighting examples of discrimination
toward its members. IRA posts tended to focus on existing prejudices against the LGBTQ
community, instead of emphasizing its achievements, such as the legalization of gay marriage in
June 2015. This also applies for Black Lives Matter. The content targeting the Black Lives
Matter community were mainly instances of police brutality and racism, emphasizing the poor
treatment of black people in the United States specifically. Sometimes, the content contained
rally times and locations likely in an attempt to garner additional media attention to broaden the
audiences. Additionally, the IRA focused on further indoctrinating right and alt-right groups. The
content published targeting these groups tended to emphasize polarizing issues within the
Republican party including Islamism, treatment of war veterans, the confederacy, Immigrants,
democratic candidates, political correctness, Donald Trump, the American flag, Black Lives
Matter, and the police. The content targeting each of the main audiences was meant to elicit
strong emotional response. However, the content targeting primarily democratic audiences, such
as the LGBT community and Black Lives Matter, tended to undermine achievements among
these groups, whereas the content targeting conservative audiences was meant to unite the party
under specific, and often extreme, ideologies.
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Findings

It is important to acknowledge that while the discussion of polarizing issues in the news
and on social media platforms impacted the social and political environment surrounding the
2016 U.S. election, there were other factors that contributed to the growing partisan divide. The
rhetoric of both candidates, and in particular Republican candidate Donald Trump, added to
partisan tension. Russia chose to support Trump because he made Russian active measures more
successful. Trump’s agenda aligned with that of Russia. Both undermine intelligence, peddle
false narratives, and cause chaos domestically and internationally. The Kremlin believed that if it
could assist in getting Trump elected, he would take over in furthering disinformation in the
United States. Then, Russia could simply reiterate disinformation being produced in the United
States.88 In the 2016 election, the media and presidential candidates’ discussion of race, police
brutality, and LGBTQ rights was amplified by Russian disinformation efforts to further divide
the American public.
On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in all
fifty states.89 Unsurprisingly, posts by the IRA about LGBTQ rights were extremely prevalent
during the summer of 2015. Although the LGBTQ community achieved its long-time goal of
legalizing same-sex marriage, Russian disinformation sought to sow discord among its members,
reminding them that discrimination toward their community was far from over. The content
published on social media platforms tended to be crafted from actual events. For example, one
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Facebook post by the IRA on July 10, 2015 stated “This man is a great example of human filth
and lies!! Rape children!?! Really?! Are you nuts?! ... Louisiana Justice refused to obey Supreme
Court, writes opinion implying gay people rape their children". This post came after Louisiana
Supreme Court Justice Jefferson D. Hughes III stated, “The most troubling prospect of same sex
marriage is the adoption by same sex partners of a young child of the same sex.”90 The justice’s
comment demonstrates discrimination toward same-sex couple and the LGBTQ community, and
Russian trolls used the implied context of this quote to elicit an emotional response from the
American public. Russian troll posts about the LGBTQ community tended to target supporters
and advocates, not adversaries. The LGBTQ community made impressive strides in the time
leading up to the election including legalizing gay marriage. The objective of the IRA regarding
discussion around the LGBTQ community was to undermine democratic accomplishments in an
attempt to render the democratic party ineffective. In another Facebook post archived by the U.S
House Intelligence Committee, the IRA wrote “Please...STOP DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
HOMOSEXUAL TEACHERS.” This post received over 2,100 impressions. An impression is the
number of times the ad or post is on a user’s screen.91 Another posted stated, "Homophobic nurse
tries to discourage birth mom from allowing gay couple to adopt child".92 The purpose of these
posts was to elicit strong emotions from members and supporters of the LGBTQ community.
The legalization of same-sex marriage in the United States was a major milestone for
progressives around the world, and posts like the ones mentioned above insinuate that
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discrimination will always counteract any progressive strides. One of the most effective
characteristics of Russian disinformation is that it is repetitive. From late June to mid-July, posts
about the LGBTQ community and the discrimination it faced were consistently written on the
troll-made Facebook page, LGBT United. Sometimes the same content would be posted multiple
times, but most of the time new headlines were used to attract more attention and reach a wider
audience.
One of the United States’ most valued principles is free speech, and Russia used this to
its advantage in its disinformation campaign efforts. Political beliefs from the left and right were
frequently posted on social media and broadcasted by the media which allowed Russian
disinformation to remain covert. In 2014, the Black Lives Matter movement gained momentum
after Michael Brown, an African American teenager, was shot and killed by a police officer in
Ferguson, Missouri. IRA posts between 2015 and 2016 constantly commented on the treatment
of African Americans by police officers and frequently included names and news headlines. On
Facebook, sponsors have the ability to use ads to target specific cities, and this feature was used
by Russian trolls. In some cases, IRA posts targeted specific cities with large African American
populations such as New Orleans, Memphis, Atlanta, and Cleveland. Additionally, some posts
specifically targeted cities where African Americans had been fatally shot by police officers,
such as Ferguson, Missouri. The content frequently mentions southern states and cities were the
history of racial injustice and inequality elicits an emotional response, the KKK, and the
shootings of unarmed African Americans by cops.
The history of racism in the United States is one of the most prominent social issues.
Russian trolls use racial injustice as a way to pit groups of people against each other and their
country. One IRA post on the “Black Matters” Facebook page stated “Nothing really changes.
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Everything remains the same. Being black is awesome, it’s being black in America that sucks.”
This post in particular attempts to dismiss any strides toward racial justice made in the United
States and seeks to convince the African American population that the injustices they face will
always exist.
Interestingly, the “Black Matters” content with the most impressions and clicks were ads
that simply stated “Join us because we care. Black Matters!” These ads targeted black
populations in large metropolitan areas. It is likely these less polarizing posts were more
effective at gaining likes and followers because it presented a social justice effort that many
people felt compelled to support. However, once a person liked the page, he or she was subjected
to polarizing content that was unavoidable. Similar to the object of the IRA concerning the
LGBTQ, the IRA sought to render the democratic party ineffective. However, instead of
undermining democratic accomplishments, the IRA used police brutality and obvious cases of
racism in an attempt to garner distrust toward the democratic party, which is commonly
associated with advancing rights for and treatment toward minorities.
Similar to how Russian trolls tried to appeal to the African American community by
highlighting the issue of race, they also used fake accounts and sponsored ads to appeal to farright audiences. One post from the alt-right IRA facebook page “Being Patriotic” in 2015 stated
“NAACP wants removal of Confederate generals from Stone Mountain. The USA is out of
balance now. We loose our history! The gays, lesbians and trans-sexuals have more rights now
then other folks.” This page in particular targeted right-wing nationalists by accentuating positive
sentiments toward the confederacy and gun rights while simultaneously competing them against
social issues, such as racism and LGBTQ rights.
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IRA Instagram and Facebook pages also focused on specific social issues within right or
left wing ideology. For example, instagram page @stop_refugees, created anti-immigration and
anti-refugee content. Instagram page @stay4police which emphasized “Backing the Blue” was
the antithesis of the troll page @blackunionus. Additionally, Instagram pages target extremists,
especially those with right-wing beliefs.
Instagram page @south_united, considered
itself “Confederate page #1 on Instagram!”
Instagram pages for patriotic Texans,
members of the Tea Party, supporters of
veterans, and Muslims were created by
trolls to target wide ranges of audiences.
Russian trolls used these pages to further
indoctrinate audiences while also
convincing them their enemies lie on the
opposite side of the political spectrum.
As the election drew closer, posts
and ads about the presidential candidates
became more prevalent and increasingly
polarizing. These posts tended to portray

Figure 1. IRA Instagram post
utilizing well-known adult
cartoon, Family Guy, to
demonstrate aversion toward
Clinton’s slogan, “Ready for
Hillary.”

Republican candidate Donald Trump in a
positive and moral light and portrayed Democratic
candidate Hillary Clinton in a negative light. A couple posts on Muslim pages professed support
for Hillary Clinton, but the majority voiced strong negative opinions about the former Secretary
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of State. A post by “Stop A.I” stated “It's wrong if you support Hillary Clinton, who said that
problems within the Veterans Affairs Department have ‘'not been as widespread'...WE CANNOT
TRUST HILLARY TO TAKE CARE OF OUR
VETERANS!” Russian trolls used capitalization
and punctuation to emphasize emotion and evoke
similar responses from their target audiences.
These posts did not only use words to elicit these
responses, but also sometimes used explicit
pictures and memes. In Figure 193, Russian trolls
make a reference to the adult cartoon Family Guy
in an attempt to attract an audience who
extremely dislikes Hillary Clinton. Other posts
closer to the election also pitted Clinton and
Trump against each other, comparing Trump to
Figure 2. IRA Facebook post which
compares Democratic candidate
Hillary Clinton to the devil and
Republic Candidate Donald Trump
to Jesus

Jesus and Clinton to the devil. In Figure 294, this
Facebook post attempts to convince its audience that
Trump is a more moral person than Clinton. This content
posted on the “Army of Jesus” page depicted Jesus and

Satan fighting for control. The content on this page sought to appeal to religious, right-winged
audiences hence the use of religious references in the post. The post implies that Donald Trump
has “godly moral principles” and voting for him will “help Jesus win.”
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Russian trolls used Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook to belittle social justice
achievements, indoctrinate audiences based on pre-existing political beliefs, and support Donald
Trump over Hillary Clinton. The IRA did this covertly and effectively by constantly uploading
content to gain support from wide ranges of audiences. The IRA’s methods were cheap,
repetitive, and effective. They were effective in the sense that their content on Facebook alone
reached over 126 million Americans.95 However, the IRA was not the only way Russia
implemented its disinformation campaigns. During this election, Russian media played an overt
role in attempting to discredit Hillary Clinton. In August 2016, well-known Russian government
run news outlet, RT, reported on multiple occasions that Clinton was a corrupt and unhealthy
individual. Another Russian government owned news outlet, Sputnik, called Clinton the “Queen
of War”. Similar to “chernyi piar” tactics used during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election,
the Russian media tended to focus less on “pro-Trump” propaganda and instead emphasize “antiClinton” sentiments.96

Discussion

Russian active measures efforts during the 2016 U.S. presidential election were primarily
conducted through the use of propaganda. On Facebook, the IRA purchased over 3,393
advertisements and created 470 Facebook pages. The IRA published over 80,000 posts on those
pages. On Twitter, over 36,000 Russian bots tweeted about the 2016 U.S. presidential election
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accumulating over 288 million impressions and over 130,000 tweets were released by the IRA.97
Russian disinformation during the 2016 U.S. presidential election used similar methods to that of
the 2004 Ukraine presidential election and that of Soviet times. It sought to undermine
democratic institutions, favored one candidate over the other, and utilized social and political
issues to divide groups of people. The biggest change to Russian active measures techniques
over the past couple decades has been a result of technology. Social media platforms have
allowed Russia to expand its reach and employ various actors, such as trolls, to participate in
these active measures campaigns. Whereas the Soviet active measures were thorough, wellresearched, and primarily isolated campaigns, Russian active measures have adopted a “quantity
over quality” approach. Russian active measures use the media to multiply the effectiveness of
their campaigns and reach more audiences. With the idea of “fake news” taking over journalist
integrity in the United States, the American public is struggling to determine what is fact and
what is fiction.
This form of political warfare will likely only become more sophisticated as technology
continues to develop. Artificial Intelligence and the production of “deep fakes” or the “digital
manipulation of sound, images, or video to impersonate someone or make it appear that a person
did something” make Russian disinformation campaigns more dangerous.98 Russian
disinformation will continue to evolve, and in order to combat these campaigns, democracies
around the world need to support transparency, fair elections, and civic liberties.
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Conclusion

In this thesis, I find that Russian active measures are a foreign policy tool that allows
Russia to solidify its international interests in a covert and targeted manner. Since the time of the
Soviet Union, Russian active measures have evolved to be more direct yet less consolidated, and
therefore, more dangerous. These campaigns are faster, more repetitive, and continuous.99 This
would not have been possible without the growth of technology. Technology has given Russian
active measures campaigns a cover, a larger audience, and new resources to effectively
disseminate falsehoods. Russia is not simply using one media platform to conduct active
measures campaigns. Instead, technology allows for the media multiplier effect which states that
audiences are more susceptible to a message if they see it in more than one place.100 The goal of
active measures has remained the same since the fall of the Soviet Union: to weaken the West
and its democratic institutions and/or maintain influence in regions where it has political or
economic interests. As the world has become more connected, the Kremlin has been able to
distance itself from these campaigns by utilizing third parties such as trolls and bots. The
ecosystem of Russian active measures was once almost solely composed of intelligence officers,
but the growth of technology has introduced a plethora of new and increasingly indiscernible
actors.
However, government and non-government agencies are working to fight against
disinformation campaigns. One of the most successful ways in which this is done is through
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information sharing. When countries share the information, they have concerning disinformation
campaigns, it helps others discern possible campaigns within and outside of their own borders. It
is important that governments, NGOs, INGOs, and other organizations record instances of
disinformation so that the public can be aware of how, where, and to whom disinformation is
being disseminated. The EU has released a counter-disinformation campaign which includes a
written memo called EUvsDisinfo that seeks to identify disinformation published on various
platforms.101 Russian influence operations are domestic issues just as much as they are foreign
issues. Only about 50 percent of people in their 20s believe living in a democracy is important.
In order to combat Russian active measures, we need to focus on creating a united message that
demonstrates to the world that the United States is a strong and important player.102 Russian
active measures are growing as a result of technology, making it easier for perpetrators to
conduct and harder for victims to discern. Russia has used active measures campaigns as a main
policy objective to undermine the sovereignty of countries around the world for its own
international and domestic agendas. It is likely that with the growth of technology, especially
Artificial Intelligence, Russian active measures will only become more advanced and more
dangerous to democracies around the world.
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